Missouri Supreme Court
JEFFERSON CITY — The Missouri Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s judgment in favor of the Blue Springs R-IV School district, concluding that the district’s denial of male restroom and locker room access to a transgender student did not constitute unlawful sex discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act.
The case, brought by a student identified as R.M.A., stemmed from a dispute dating back to the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years, according to the Missouri Supreme Court opinion filed June 10.
R.M.A., a transgender male, had transitioned socially while attending fourth grade in the district and later amended his birth certificate in 2014 to reflect a male sex designation.
During eighth and ninth grades, R.M.A. sought to use male-designated restrooms and locker rooms, but the school district denied this request.
R.M.A. filed a discrimination charge in October 2014 with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, alleging that he was denied access to a public accommodation based on sex, in violation of section 213.065.
After receiving a right-to-sue letter, he filed suit in October 2015. The case reached the Missouri Supreme Court once before in R.M.A. ex rel. Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV School District (2019), where the Court held that R.M.A. had pleaded sufficient facts to proceed with a claim of sex discrimination under the MHRA.
The case went to trial in December 2021, resulting in a jury verdict in R.M.A.’s favor. The jury awarded $175,000 in compensatory damages and assessed $4 million in punitive damages against the school district.
However, the circuit court later granted the School district’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), ruling that R.M.A. had failed to make a submissible case for sex discrimination. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed that decision.
In its ruling, authored by Judge Kelly C. Broniec, the court concluded that under the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “sex” as used in the MHRA, the statute refers only to biological sex — that is, the classification of individuals as male or female based on reproductive anatomy and genetics.
The court held that R.M.A. did not present probative evidence that his “male sex,” as legally defined, was a contributing factor in the denial of access to male facilities. Instead, the court found, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that the denial was based on R.M.A.’s female genitalia.
The majority opinion noted that neither the MHRA nor its public accommodation provisions define “sex,” and pointed to dictionary definitions that center sex as a biological concept. The court also cited the Missouri General Assembly’s repeated rejection of legislative proposals to expand the MHRA to cover gender identity and sexual orientation in the context of public accommodations.
Addressing dissenting views, the court rejected reliance on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, which held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination based on transgender status.
The justices noted that Bostock specifically declined to address issues involving bathrooms or locker rooms and applied only to employment discrimination under federal law, not public accommodations under Missouri law.
R.M.A. also challenged the jury instructions, arguing they were improperly narrow and failed to accurately reflect the statutory language. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the instructions appropriately focused on R.M.A.’s claim — namely, denial of access to male-designated restrooms and locker rooms — and correctly required a showing that R.M.A.’s male sex was a contributing factor in the alleged discrimination.
Missouri Supreme Court Judge W. Brent Powell pushed back against the court's decision.
Powell’s dissent, which aligned with Judge Paul C. Wilson’s opinion, expressed concern over what he viewed as a misapplication of the standard for granting a JNOV—a legal remedy that allows a judge to override a jury’s verdict when no reasonable interpretation of the evidence could support it.
“In R.M.A. I,” Powell wrote, “I agreed — and still do — that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word ‘sex’ refers to ‘the biological classification of individuals as male or female.’”
However, Powell noted that at trial, R.M.A. presented enough evidence to the jury to establish he was discriminated against based on his male sex, not merely his gender identity.
Missouri Supreme Court case number: SC100694
