Illinois Supreme Court Justice Mary Jane Theis
SPRINGFIELD - The Illinois Supreme Court says criminal defendants who are sentenced to jail as punishment for violating the terms of their pretrial release on electronic monitoring aren’t entitled to good behavior credit typically used to reduce the duration of a prison sentence, which could allow them to avoid the punishment altogether.
Justice Mary Jane Theis wrote the Dec. 4 opinion, resolving the case of Geoffrey Seymore.
Seymore was charged Sept. 7, 2024, with participating in production of methamphetamine. Prosecutors asked a DeKalb County judge to keep Seymore in county lockup while awaiting trial. But on Sept. 9 the judge granted release “subject to various conditions including electronic monitoring,” Theis wrote.
But the next day, Seymore was located outside his home, traveling around DeKalb, Broadview and Chicago.
On Sept. 12, prosecutors moved for sanctions. The next day a DeKalb County Circuit Court judge sanctioned Seymore with 30 days of imprisonment for violating pretrial release terms and, on the preprinted form, wrote “NO GOOD TIME TO APPLY.” Within a week, the public defender’s office argued the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act entitled Seymore to good behavior credit.
The judge denied that motion. When Seymore appealed, according to Theis, his counsel did not check any box on the section of the form in which they are asked to choose the "Nature of Order Appealed." Choices included "Denying pretrial release," "Revoking pretrial release" or "Imposing conditions of pretrial release."
"In handwriting, the public defender added a checked box and the word ‘Sanctions,'" Theis wrote.
A state appeals panel reversed the circuit court order, rejecting prosecutors’ arguments the sanctions order wasn’t subject to interlocutory appeal. That panel found the edict to be “at a minimum, an order revoking pretrial release, albeit temporarily” and further that “serving the sanction became a condition of continued release.” The panel suggested the judge could have, instead of approving the sanction, modified Seymore’s conditions, noting that type of outcome is inarguably appealable.
Ultimately, the appeals panel reasoned the criminal procedure code doesn’t explicitly address good-behavior credit with regards to jail sanctions and pretrial release, which it said established the General Assembly didn’t intend the exception bolstering prosecutors’ arguments.
Theis said the sanction didn’t impose conditions of pretrial release, nor did it revoke or deny such release.
“One hallmark of a final and, consequently, appealable order is whether, if affirmed, the trial court has only to proceed with the execution of the judgment,” Theis wrote. “The trial court’s sanctions order did not terminate the criminal case against the defendant on the merits. In fact, neither the court’s sanctions order nor the court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for relief mentioned the underlying charges against the defendant. Those two orders, however, did dispose of a distinct, collateral matter — namely, the defendant’s willful violation of the electronic monitoring condition and the appropriate sanction for that violation — that firmly settled his rights as to that matter. If that order had been affirmed and the case remanded to the trial court, the trial court would have had no other task than to execute its order.”
The court likened the sanctions to a contempt order issued when one party violates an order from earlier in a legal proceeding. Because the sanctions order stemmed from a petition for sanctions — a process “collateral to and independent of the underlying criminal case,” Theis wrote — it was a final order and the appellate court had jurisdiction.
Seymore also noted he already served 30 days in county jail before filing the appeal notice. While reviewing courts generally don’t decide moot questions, Theis explained, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate panel that the public interest exception is applicable because the underlying question “is clearly substantial and important to the public.”
Further, she said, because judges could legally order no more than 30 days in the county lockup, “the issue will always be moot by the time a reviewing court has a chance to rule.” She also projected “the question clearly is likely to recur as defendants violate conditions of their pretrial release and trial courts consider appropriate sanctions,” a seeming nod to ongoing debate about Illinois’ recent abolition of cash bail and consistent calls to reform pretrial release laws amid concern about accused suspects committing more crimes while awaiting trial for other alleged offenses.
Turning to the merits of the actual issue, the court noted prosecutors’ argument that a sanction of 30 days behind bars isn’t a prison sentence as the Behavior Allowance Act defines. The court agreed, noting the law “creates a presumption of good-conduct credit for ‘any person who commences a sentence of confinement in a county jail’ ” but Seymore never started a statute-defined sentence, depriving him of the ability to claim good-conduct credit.
That said, Theis noted, the law does allow for the 30 days of confinement to be applied toward an eventual prison sentence should one follow a conviction on any underlying offenses. The court referenced the different conditions the General Assembly delineated for when someone could not qualify for good behavior credit and noted each directly incorporates the word “sentenced,” and a “sanction is not a sentence.”
The court rejected Seymore’s argument the sanction is comparable to an imprisonment sentence for someone found in criminal contempt, finding the legal proceedings that lead to such outcomes “are markedly different,” including the much higher standard of proof for criminal contempt when compared to the simple clear and convincing proof someone in Seymore’s position violated a pretrial release condition.
